Introduction.

Genetic information has been the subject of much controversy within technology and ethics. In particular, the debate has revolved around the rights of the individual providing the genetic samples. Most practitioners agree that there should be more nuance to the legality, ethics, and process of collecting genetic samples from individuals. There are two main sentiments within the genetic information controversy. The progressive sentiment focuses on the benefits of collecting genetic information from individuals and populations. The conservatism sentiment looks to the inevitable infringement of the individual’s moral right to withhold genetic information. This paper sides with the conservatism sentiment by arguing that individuals must retain their right to privacy with respect to their genetic information. in addition, this paper concludes that the individual falls under no moral obligation to disclose their genetic information to third parties.

The right to one’s privacy with respect to their genetic information is a fundamental right held by any individual and superseded by none. That is, no recognized human right supersedes the individual’s right to their genetic privacy. Even the right to life- were we to assume that another individual’s genetic information could save another person’s life- does not supersede the right to one’s privacy of their genetic information. Genetic information, at its core, is an abstract possession of the individual to whom it belongs. The only exception to this rule is a gray one, which pertains to instances where an individual has expressly allowed a third party to collect their genetic information. According to Chadwick (2008, p.162), the doctrines concerning the collection of genetic information are far from adequate. They are inadequate to protect the individual from misappropriating their genetic information. For instance, an individual could choose to provide their genetic details but is limited in their knowledge of how the third party intends to use their genetic information. Without a contract that absolutely separates the ownership of the genetic information from the individual that provides it, one must conclude that there can be no right higher than an individual’s right to one’s privacy of genetic information. To that end, no individual can be morally obligated to provide their own genetic information to a third party.

Individuals are morally obligated to protect themselves and their families from harm. Such harm can be caused by allowing third parties to access and retain one’s genetic information. An individual is first and foremost responsible for their own self. His self pertains not just to his body and mind but also to his freedom. This argument is not just relevant; it is also important. This is because it contradicts the proposition that an individual could be morally obligated to provide genetic information about themselves. Allowing third parties to collect one’s genetic information has been linked to a number of severe disadvantages. First, insurance companies may decline to offer insurance premiums to individuals diagnosed with certain illnesses, such as cystic fibrosis and breast cancer (Evans et al., 2001, p. 1053-1054). This means that the procurement of genetic information may actually negatively impact the quality of life for the individual it was procured from. Secondly, the knowledge of mutations that exist in minorities has- in the past, been used to discriminate against minorities. This shows that there is an actual and severe disadvantage to be accrued if one decides to share their genetic information. Insurance companies will decline to offer premiums regardless of whether the disease has manifested or is unlikely to manifest. That is, an individual applying for an insurance premium will not just be judged by their genetic makeup but by the genetic makeup of known relatives. Some diseases are hereditary or genetically prevalent in a family, meaning that entire families could be denied insurance premiums (Fulda and Lykens, 2006, p.143). Based on this information, an individual could be argued to be morally obligated to protect their genetic information and that of their families. And this moral obligation cannot coexist with that of being required to provide one’s genetic information to third parties.

There is no moral connection between harming others and keeping one’s genetic information private. To understand this concept, it is necessary to apply an abstract example. Person A’s life, property, or freedom are in jeopardy. Person B is an ordinary person whose genetic information could save Person A from losing their life, property, or freedom. The solution in this conundrum cannot be derived by sacrificing Person B’s genetic information. More importantly, there can b